Jun 09, 2014 Re: Cracking Mifare Classic 1K Ok, so you're using a newer client software on the PC-side, but the device is old. I would recommend that you flash the device with the new code. This kit consists of the Pegoda II reference design reader-writer, a set of MIFARE ® family tag samples and a CD-ROM with documentation and the RFIDDiscover PC user interface software for handling communication to the Pegoda II reader and card ICs.
People are starting to wake up to the fact that RFID-enabled smartcards now can be far more easily, and cheaply, cracked than ever before, as a trio of young computer experts recently showed.
These are a particular type of processor-embedded cards, and are different from credit cards. The actual decryption work by the researchers was done on the widely deployed Mifare Classic wireless smartcard, now manufactured by a Philips spinoff, NXP Semiconductors. Decrypted, the cards can be counterfeited, and users' personal and bank data is exposed.
That card is the basis of such new systems as the Dutch OV-Chipkaart, being rolled out in The Netherlands as part of a multi-billion dollar nationwide transportation ticketing system, and the so-called CharlieCard, used in the Boston subway system. The decryption breach triggered a firestorm of controversy, and Dutch authorities apparently have halted the rollout and are investigating the vulnerabilities.
The card can be used in debit/credit transactions with the user's bank account. This personal and important data is encrypted on the Mifare Classic with a proprietary encryption scheme.
The newest attack was demonstrated at the 24th Congress of the Chaos Computer Club in Berlin last December. Interest in the study has been spreading steadily from the arcane world of security hackers. One of the researchers is Karsten Nohl, a graduate student in the University of Virginia's Computer Science Department, in Charlottesville, the other two are Henryk Plotz and 'Starbug.' The trio apparently demonstrated a practical and effective way to break the Mifare encryption key, confirming what many cryptographers had suspected.
The team used an inexpensive RFID reader to collect encrypted data, and then reverse-engineered the chip to figure out the encryption key to decipher that data. They examined the chip under an optical microscope and used micro-polishing sandpaper to remove a few microns of the surface at time, photographing each of the five layers of circuitry. Nohl wrote his own optical recognition software to refine and clarify the images, and then patiently worked through the arrangement of the logic gates to deduce the encryption algorithm, a task made possible by the fact that the Mifare Classic relies on a secret key of no more than 48 bits.
'Regardless of the cryptographic strength of the cipher, the small key space therefore permits counterfeiting of any card that is read wirelessly,' the team wrote in a follow-up statement issued on Jan. 8. 'Knowing the details of the cipher would permit anyone to try all possible keys in a matter of days,' the researchers noted. 'Given basic knowledge of cryptographic trade-offs and sufficient storage, the secret keys of cards can be found in a matter of minutes.'
Cheap trick live at budokan rar. The Dutch transit system actually uses two other types of tickets or cards, and both have been successfully attacked by other researchers.
Mifare Key Cracker Arduino
Nohl and his colleagues noted that other types of Phillips RFID tags, such as the Hitag2+ and Mifare DESfire, are not affected by their findings. Uad plug-ins crack.
RFID security concerns have become pronounced over the past year or so, as hackers and researchers make more concerted efforts to understand the vulnerabilities. Tna impact game free download pc. In mid-2007, one team used readily available RFID gear to read the Electronic Product Code data on tagged boxes loaded on a tractor-trailer. A year earlier, another group raised the specter that RFID tags could be infected with computer viruses.
Mifare Key Cracker Android
This story, 'Hackers Find a Way to Crack Popular Smartcard in Minutes' was originally published by Network World.
Note: When you purchase something after clicking links in our articles, we may earn a small commission. Read our affiliate link policy for more details.
Last month, the Dutch government issued a warning about the security of access keys based on the ubiquitous MiFare Classic RFID chip. Thewarning comes on the heels of an ingenious hack, spearheaded by Henryk Plotz, a German researcher, and Karsten Nohl, a doctoral candidate incomputer science at the University of Virginia, that demonstrated a way to crack the encryption on the chip.
Millions upon millions of MiFare Classic chips are used worldwide in contexts such as payment cards for public transportationnetworks throughout Asia, Europe and the U.S. and in building-access passes.
The report asserts that systems employing MiFare will likely be secure for another two years, since hacking the chipseems to be an involved and expensive process. But in a recent report published by Nohl, titled 'Cryptanalysis of Crypto-1,' he presents anattack that recovers secret keys in mere minutes on an average desktop PC.
Handbook of banking information n toor pdf merge. In December, Nohl and Plotz gave a presentation on MiFare's security vulnerabilities at the 24th Chaos Communications Congress (24C3), the annual four-day conference organized by Germany's notorious hacking collective, the Chaos Computer Club (CCC). Thousands of hackers from far-flung locales converged on Berlin between Christmas and New Year's for a raft of talks and project demonstrations.
In their popular talk at 24C3, punctuated by bursts of raucous applause, Nohl presented an overview of radio frequency identification security vulnerabilities and the process of hacking the MiFare chip's means of encryption, known as the Crypto-1 cipher. 'This is the first public announcement that the Crypto-1 cipher on the MiFare tag is known,' said Nohl in December at the 24C3 talk. 'We will give out further details next year.'
Get out the microscopes
To hack the chip, Nohl and Plotz reverse-engineered the cryptography on the MiFare chip through a painstaking process. They examined theactual MiFare Classic chip in exacting detail using a microscope and the open-source OpenPCD RFID reader and snapped several in-depthphotographs of the chip's architecture. The chip is tiny -- about a 1-millimeter-square shred of silicon -- and is composed sed of severallayers.
The researchers sliced off the minuscule layers of the chip and took photos of each layer. There are thousands of tiny blocks on thechip -- about 10,000 in all -- each encoding something such as an AND gate or an OR gate or a flip-flop.
![]()
Analyzing all of the blocks on the chip would have taken forever, but there was a shortcut. 'We couldn't actually look at all 10,000 of these small building blocks, so we wanted to categorize them a bit before we started analyzing,' said Nohl at 24C3. 'We observed that there aren't actually 10,000 different ones. They're all taken from a library of cells. There are only about 70 different types of gates; we ended up writing MATLAB scripts that once we select one instance of a gate finds allthe other ones.'
![]()
To find the cryptographically important regions of the chip, Nohl and Plotz scanned for clues in the blocks: long strings of flip-flops thatwould implement the register important to the cipher, XOR gates that are virtually never used in control logic, and blocks on the edge ofthe chip that were sparsely connected to the rest of the chip, but strongly connected to each other.
They then reconstructed the circuit using their data, and from the reconstruction, they read the functionality. It was a painful process, but once it was done, the researchers had decoded the security on the chip, unveiling several vulnerabilities. Among the potential securityrisks they uncovered was a 16-bit random number generator that was easy to manipulate -- so easy, in fact, that they were able to coax thegenerator into producing the same 'random' number in every transaction, effectively crippling the security.
Simpler from here on out
A potential attacker wouldn't have to go through all of the steps that Nohl and Plotz had to undertake to hack the RFID chip. A diagram ofthe Crypto-1 cipher, published in Nohl's recent paper, shows that the heart of the cipher is a 48-bit linear feedback shift register and afilter function. To find bits of the key, an attacker would send challenges to the reader and analyze the first bit of key stream sentback to the reader.
Though there are some tricks to generating these challenges, it is computationally not a terribly expensive, or expansive, procedure.'The number of challenges needed to recover key bits with high probability varies for different bits, but generally does not exceed afew dozen,' writes Nohl in the paper.
At 24C3, Nohl warned against the increasing ubiquity of RFID tags. 'We need some level of authentication, some security that has yet to be added to many of these applications,' he said. He pointed to the increasing use of RFID tags in public transit systems, car keys,passports, and even World Cup tickets -- and the potential worrying privacy implications of large-scale RFID tagging of products by big retailers such as Wal-Mart Stores Inc.
The gist? If you rely on MiFare Classic security for anything, you may want to start moving to a different system.
Comments are closed.
|
AuthorWrite something about yourself. No need to be fancy, just an overview. ArchivesCategories |